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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the survival of the complete cohort of more than 162,000 limited
companies incorporated in Britain in 2001 over the subsequent five-year period. For this
purpose, we estimate firms’ hazards of failure and survival functions using nonparamet-
ric and semi-parametric techniques. The paper focuses on two important policy-related
issues. The first is to what extent survival rates vary across regions in Britain. A
second, and related, policy issue concerns innovation. The data available allows us
to look at the intellectual property (IP) activity of all British firms, including that of
the 162,000 new firms in 2001. The results indicate substantial differences in survival
rates across regions, and also that IP activity is associated with a higher probability of
survival. These differences across regions, and the importance of IP activity, remain
when we condition on a large range of regional, industry and firm-level characteristics
shifting firms’ hazards of failure.
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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to analyze the survival of the complete cohort of more
than 162,000 limited companies incorporated in the United Kingdom in 2001 over the
subsequent five-year period. For this purpose, we estimate firms’ hazards of failure and
survival functions using non-parametric and semi- parametric techniques. Estimates of
survival rates are interesting in their own right but we provide new results relating to
i) regional factors and ii) intellectual property. The two main variables used to assess
regional factors are unemployment rates and house prices. For intellectual property, the
data available allows us to look at the patenting and trade marking activity of all UK
firms, including the 162,000 new firms in 2001. While empirical studies of patenting
and performance are common for larger firms, there are relatively few for small firms
and virtually none for start-ups. The use of trade mark data is also novel, although
there is recent evidence that trademarks proxy innovative activity (Greenhalgh and
Rogers, 2006, 2007). While both the regional and IP aspect of firm survival are of in-
terest to economists and policy makers alike, we are also interested in combining these
two aspects. For example, does a firm that is IP active in North East England have
the same chance of survival as an IP active firm in South East England?
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a short summary of
the relevant literature on firm survival, as well as studies that use patent and trade mark
data. The third section discusses the process of new firm creation, survival and how
this relates to the empirical estimation. The fourth section discusses the Oxford Firm
Level IP database, which makes the analysis possible. We then provide an overview of
survival rates across the different British regions, followed by the estimates of the Cox
proportional hazard model.
2 Related literature
2.1 Survival analysis
Survival analysis is commonly used in the economics literature to analyze the determi-
nants of firm failure. These papers are strikingly similar in their estimation approaches,
but differ substantially in terms of the type and depth of the data studied. The main
variables that have been found to play a role are (start-up) firm-size, ownership, indus-
try growth, age and the number of firms entering and leaving the industry.
Disney, Haskel and Heden (2003) provide an analysis of around 140,000 manufac-
turing establishments in the UK from 1986 to 1991. They find that only around 35
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percent of new entrants survive after five years. Those that do survive are around four
times larger than new entrants (in terms of employment). They use non-parametric es-
timates and a Cox proportional hazards model and, although they are limited in terms
of possible explanators, find that establishments that are part of groups have lower
exit rates. This represents, to our knowledge, the only recently published evidence on
UK firms. Mata and Portugal (1994) track a cohort of Portuguese manufacturing firms
born in 1983 to analyze determinants of their eventual failure. Mata and Portugal’s
data includes all manufacturing firms with at least five employees. They use the Cox
proportional hazards model to find that start-up size of the new-born firms, industry
growth and the number of plants operated by the new-born firms reduce the likelihood
of failure, while entry into the industry increases the likelihood. These two studies are
typical of large sample empirical work; in particular, there are often very few firm level
variables available and none that proxy innovation.
Audretsch (1991), who analyzed firm survival at the industry level, did include a
variable on innovation. The industry level innovation variables were derived from iden-
tifying new products and processes in over 100 industry journals. Audretsch finds that
survival rates can be higher in more innovative industries. Audretsch and Mahmood
(1995) use this industry level variable in a Cox proportional hazards model of survival
for around 12,000 US manufacturing firms founded in 1976. They identify a number of
factors associated with firm survival. The larger the new firm’s employment, relative
to industry’s minimum efficiency scale (MES), the higher survival. New firm survival is
lower when industry innovation rates are high (and there is no counteracting effect from
small firm innovation rates as in Audretsch, 1991). They also find higher unemploy-
ment rates to be associated with lower survival rates. They also find that stand-alone
companies have a lower likelihood to fail compared to branches or subsidiaries. This
finding may appear counterintuitive, as one might expect subsidiaries to receive sup-
port from parents. However, subsidiaries may be under pressure to perform and their
parents may be quick to close them down if they do not.
Cefis and Marsili (2005) use firm-level dummies to distinguish between innovating
and non-innovating firms in a sample of 3,275 new-born Dutch firms over the period
1996-2003. They find that innovators benefit from an innovation premium giving them
higher life expectancy (11 percent higher survival time for innovating firms). They also
distinguish between product and process innovations,1 finding that firms introducing
process innovations experience a 25 percent increase in survival time, while product
innovations do not have any statistically significant effect. Using Pavitt’s (1984) sector
1The information on innovation comes from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS-2).
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classification according to their technological intensity, they also find that firms in
technologically more intensive sectors have higher chances of survival, which stands in
direct contrast to the findings by Audretsch and Mahmood (2005). According to their
results, firm survival is also influenced by age and size. However, size has decreasing
effects on firm survival.
Cockburn and Wagner (2007) use a small sample of 356 internet-related firms that
made an IPO on the NASDAQ during the dot-com boom between 1998 and 2001. All
firms are in Internet or software industries. During this boom period, the US Patent
and Trademark Office made it possible to apply for patents on software and notably on
business methods, and the authors match patent data to their sample. Hence, they can
test whether patents of that category had any different effect on survival compared to
patents in ‘traditional’ categories. They find that patenting is positively related with
firm survival. Firms that applied for more patents were less likely to exit the market.
However, due to the specific sample used by Cockburn and Wagner, the authors are
unable to control for the environment in which the firms operate by using industry-
level variables. Finally, Jensen et al. (2006) use a sample of 260,000 Australian firms
that were alive at some stage over 1997-2003. They also have patents and trademark
data at the firm level. Using a piece-wise exponential hazard function they find that
trademarking is associated with greater survival for ‘new’ firms (post 1997 entry), but
that patenting has no significant association.
2.2 Patents and trade marks
Schumpeter (1934) suggested a distinction between inventions, describing new discov-
eries, and innovation, describing the successful implementation of an invention into
a commercial product. Intellectual property in form of patents and trade marks can
capture both aspects of Schumpeter’s typology.
Since Schmookler (1966), many researchers have used patents as an indicator of
innovation, even though it really only indicates invention. As such, patents have been
found to be positively correlated with firms’ productivity and market value (Hall, 2000,
Griliches, 1990, Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002, Klette and Kortum, 2004). Thus, firms
with a larger number of patents should be expected to be more innovative and, therefore,
have a competitive advantage. Patents may also serve strategic purposes, such as
deterring and blocking competitors from entering a certain market (Hall, 2007).
Trade marks have not been extensively used in previous studies, but there is some
evidence that they proxy some aspects of the end of the innovation process (just as
patents sometimes proxy the start). Fundamentally, trade marks provide a signalling
function to indicate a certain level of quality or other characteristics that consumers
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can expect from a product. As such, trade marks help consumers reduce search costs
and hence producers are able to sell larger quantities or charge a higher price (Landes
and Posner, 1987). This availability of such a signalling function can be integral to
the innovation process, since trade marks generate some protection against imitation.
Hence, Greenhalgh and Rogers (2007) argue that trade marks proxy product innovation
by firms (see also Mendoca et al., 2004). Overall, trade mark data is likely to proxy some
new product innovation and also a range of activities that are associated with product
innovation, such as marketing, advertising and design. Perhaps more importantly, trade
mark data may capture which firms are better at this bundle of activities.
3 Idea generation, start-ups and modeling survival
As indicated above, empirical studies on firm survival are generally not based on struc-
tural models. However, it is valuable to outline the basic processes at work. The process
is driven by entrepreneurs who generate a constant stream of new business ideas and
then, if the idea is considered above a certain value, set up firms to capitalize on these.
These ideas are then tested in the market place and, as is well known, there is a large
failure rate. Firms will continuously evaluate their prospects and, when they see no
likelihood of success, they will exit.2 We can think of failure stemming from one, or
both, of two principal aspects:
i) The underlying quality of the firm’s idea relative to others in the market place
ii) The resources available to the entrepreneur to capitalize on the idea.
Resources could include finance, and the related capital, labour and materials; but
they could also include knowledge about production methods or markets. There is
also an important role for competitive pressure, by either incumbents or other new
entrants, in affecting a firm’s survival chances. This competitive pressure can be in
various forms, such as substitute goods reducing demand, or competitor firms using
up, or raising the costs of, resources (e.g. skilled labor). In a simple situation one can
think of competition acting to select the best ideas but, in reality, there is an interplay
between ideas and resources. A firm with an idea whose quality is below average may
still be able to survive if it has more resources.3
These observations mean that an empirical model should allow exit to occur at any
time and that the probability of exit should depend on a range of variables proxying
2This is, in fact, a legal requirement since it is an offence for directors to allow a firm to continue
trading if they adjudge the firm to not be a ‘going concern’.
3As marketing experts will quickly tell you, the best product idea in the world will get no where if
no consumer finds out about it.
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the quality of idea, resources available and intensity of competition. Previous studies
have focused on competitive conditions, and have also used firm age and size as proxies
for a firm’s resources. Our data is rich enough to only look at firms of the same age
(the 2001 cohort) removing the need to rely on age as a proxy for resources. However,
we also include firm size as a further conditioning variable. In addition, we introduce
three new variables that capture the resources available to entrepreneurs: whether the
firm is located near a university, the number of directors of the firm and the average
house price. House prices may be critical since entrepreneurs often use their house as
collateral for loans (or remortgage to gain access to funds). Regional differences may be
important as availability of resources and market conditions may vary across regions.
To investigate these issues we include unemployment rates by county and unitary au-
thority. House prices may also play a role here as they are a proxy for rentals and wage
costs. As in previous studies, a range of industry-level competition variables is also
included.
Most existing studies, however, do not condition on the quality of the underlying
idea. In our analysis IP can be considered as a proxy for a better quality idea hence,
ceteris paribus, IP should increase the probability of survival. The IP variables could
also proxy better ‘resources’, such as management quality or human capital at the
firm. A further possibility is that the IP variables capture the reduction in competition
(which is of course the textbook, legal role of IP). One reason why we are reluctant to
stress this last interpretation is that we are using publications of IP, and not grants.
Legally, it is only after the grant of a patent (or registration of a trade mark) that the
IP right has its full effect. Another reason is that start-up firms may have difficulty in
enforcing IP rights, due to the cost of enforcement in the courts. These issues mean
that, in this paper at least, the IP variables are best interpreted as proxies for the
quality of the idea, as well as management and human capital.
4 The OFLIP database
4.1 General
The data used for the analysis comes from the Oxford Firm Level IP (OFLIP) database.
The database draws on the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) data that covers
the entire population of registered UK firms (FAME downloads data from Companies
House records).4 OFLIP contains additional information on the IP activity of firms in
4In this paper we use firms to mean registered firms. Hence firm refers to the legal entity that
organizes production, in contrast to census-type data that uses the plant or production unit.
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the form of patents and trade marks. OFLIP has been constructed by matching the
FAME database and a number of firm-level IP datasets.5
The FAME database is a commercial database provided by Bureau van Dijk.6 To
construct the data set, the December 2006 edition of FAME has been used. It covers
around 2.04 million active firms. For all of these firms, basic information, such as name,
registered address, firm type, and industry code are available. Availability of financial
information varies substantially across firms. The smallest firms are legally required
to submit only very basic balance sheet information such as shareholders’ funds and
total assets. The largest firms provide a large range of profit and loss information as
well as detailed balance sheet data. Importantly, the FAME database also lists around
0.9 million so called ‘inactive’ firms. These inactive firms are those that have exited
the market and belong to one of the following categories: dissolved, liquidated, entered
receivership or declared non-trading. The fact that FAME tracks inactive firms allows
us to identify all firms entering and exiting the market throughout the five-year period
observed.7 FAME gives exact dates for market entry in the form of a firm’s incorpora-
tion date. To determine date of exit we use the date that the last set of accounts were
filed.8 The firm-level data is augmented by regional data on house prices and unem-
ployment (at the county and unitary authority level). Further details are in Appendix
A.
4.2 IP data
The IP data used for the construction of the OFLIP database comes from three different
sources: the UK IP Office, Marquesa Ltd. and the European Patent Office (EPO)
ESPACE Bulletin. Data on UK patent publications were supplied by the UK IP Office.
Marquesa Ltd supplied data on UK trade mark publications and Community (OHIM)
marks registered. Data on EPO publications by British entities was downloaded from
ESPACE Bulletin DVD 2006/001. For our analysis, we use publications of UK patents,
trade marks and EPO patents, as well as registrations for Community trade marks
(further details and a discussion of the IP data is in Appendix A).
5For details on the matching process and further details on the database see Rogers, Helmers, and
Greenhalgh (2007).
6http://www.bvdep.com/en/FAME.html
7As such, the data set is much wider in coverage than for example the one used by Bridges and
Guariglia (2006) who also use the FAME database for their firm survival analysis.
8This is an important advantage of OFLIP over census data sets used in previous work, such as
Dunne et al. (1987). In cases where the exit date was missing, the date of last annual return or the
date of last transaction at companies house is used instead.
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5 Overview of survival
Figure 1: Entry / Exit rates for population of UK firms 2001-2005
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Entry and exit rates for the population of registered firms in the UK between 2001
and 2005 are plotted in Figure 1. The exit rate slightly decreased over the period
observed, while the entry rate substantially increased between 2001 and 2003. The
reason for this was a change in the tax law in 2002. The UK Government introduced
a zero percent rate of corporation tax for registered companies with profits up to £
10,000. The result of this was to rapidly increase the number of sole traders that
formed companies (such as tradespeople and consultants). Over the 5-year period
shown, entry rates exceed exit rates on average by 9.5 percentage points. This implies
an average annual net increase of around 170,000 firms in the UK. The influence of the
tax change is therefore substantial and means that entry rates should be treated with
caution.9 In particular, it is thought that many IT consultants and business service sole
traders converted into registered companies in 2002 and 2003. To counter this somewhat
unintended effect, the government introduced new legislation taxing all the company’s
profit at 19 percent if the profits earned were distributed to shareholders. Hence, the
9It is not clear whether exit rates would also be biased downwards. In general, we might expect
some exit because a firm wants to convert back to a sole trader (avoiding the slightly higher admin-
istrative costs of a registered company). The tax change after 2002 would appear to outweigh these
administrative costs, hence we might expect exit to be slightly lower.
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zero percent tax rate applied only up to £ 10,000, if the profits were retained.10
Geroski (1991) found there was a positive correlation between entry rates and exit
rates across industries in the UK. Using data from 1987 he reported a correlation
coefficient of 0.79 for a sample of 95 industries. Here, we find a correlation coefficient
of only 0.20 for the five year period for a sample of 252 industries. Looking at individual
years, the correlation coefficients vary between 0.004 in 2003 and 0.28 in 2001. Given
the tax driven increase in entry rates in 2002 and 2003, the low correlation might be
expected. The possibility that the tax changes had a non-uniform effect on entry across
industries, also means that it is not possible to compare the correlation coefficients
obtained here with Geroski’s.
Our analysis focuses on the cohort of firms incorporated in 2001, this avoids the
problem arising from increased entry rates due to the change in tax regime in 2002.
Using only firms incorporated in 2001 also avoids problems of left truncation (i.e., all
firms are observed from the onset of failure risk). For our data, there were a total of
162,469 new firms registered in 2001. The survival rates for this cohort are as follows.
In 2002, 161,493 or 99.4 percent were still in business. The high figure simply reflects
that a registered company almost always survives to file its first set of accounts. By
2003, 140,215 or 86.3 percent were still in business, with 76.4 percent left by 2004, and
70.24 percent by 2005.11
5.1 Regional differences
Table 1 shows new firm formation and failure rates by region, where regions are defined
according to the definition of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) (it also shows
high-tech and IP-active firms and failure rates - see below for explanations).12 The
failure ratio is computed as one minus the fraction of newly incorporated firms still
alive in 2005 i.e., 1 − Firms2005,rdaFirms2001,rda . Specifically, the table compares the failure rate
for IP-active and non-IP active firms (159,743 in 2001) by RDA.13 The London and
10These somewhat confusing regulations are now to be abolished and only a small company tax rate
of 19 percent will apply (see HM Revenue and Customs website http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/).
11Note that when the data is used for formal survival analysis, we encounter the problem of right-
censoring. This means that for all firms of the 2001 cohort that have not exited by the end of 2005,
failure remains unobserved. The only thing that is known about these firms is that failure occurs some
time between [t,∞).
12The Regional Development Agencies Act 1998 has led to the establishment of 12 RDA’s in Britain.
We also disaggregate RDAs into county and unitary authority level data to provide further insight into
spatial patterns of survival. In order to allocate firms to counties and unitary authorities within RDAs,
we matched firms’ post codes with counties’ and unitary authorities’ post code areas. We are aware of
the fact that this may cause problems for multi-location firms. However, since we are analyzing start-up
companies, we are confident that postcodes reported in FAME indeed correspond to the actual physical
locations of firms. Note that due to data restrictions, we exclude Northern Ireland from our analysis.
13A firm is counted as IP active if it has had any form of IP within the period 2001-2005.
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North West RDAs have the highest failure rate: in London and in the North West, 35.7
percent and 30 percent respectively of 2001 firms fail by 2005. In contrast, the lowest
failure rates are in the Scottish Highlands and the South West regions.
Table 1: Number of new firms and failure rates by RDA
RDA No. of Failure rate
new firms IP-active High-tech IP-inactive IP-active
all firms high-tech all firms high-tech
South West 11,687 183 46 0.254 0.143 0.082 0
South East 26,273 442 88 0.284 0.218 0.104 0.1
London 46,255 808 66 0.357 0.339 0.113 0
East of England 11,763 198 66 0.288 0.236 0.091 0
East Midlands 7,873 147 25 0.261 0.208 0.122 0
Yorkshire 9,018 169 23 0.273 0.286 0.101 0
North West 14,957 223 50 0.301 0.298 0.148 0
West Midlands 17,482 265 61 0.289 0.241 0.094 0.286
North East 3,112 47 13 0.257 0.385 0.043 n.a.
Wales 4,387 76 25 0.268 0.261 0.079 0
Scotland 9,218 164 21 0.261 0.263 0.128 0.5
Highland 444 4 0 0.221 n.a. 0.5 n.a.
Notes:
1. A firm is counted as IP active if it has had any form of IP within the period 2001-2005.
2. High-tech firms belong to HS categories 244, 353,33,35,30.
Figure 4 also shows failure rates but this time according to the average for coun-
ties and unitary authorities (Great Britain has 142 of these covering the country). The
figure shows five different ‘shades’ of failure rates, based on the quintiles of the distribu-
tion. For example, the darkest shaded counties have a failure rate of between 31 percent
and 47 percent; the white regions have the lowest failure rate (between 5 percent and 23
percent). Clearly, these are major differences in failure rates. Note also that there are
differences across counties within RDAs. This indicates that either the support given
to new firms varies within RDAs or, more likely, that there are a great many other
mechanisms at work in driving failure rates. Figure 4 indicates that the high failure
rates occur in London, Kent, Buckingshire and the M4 corridor. One might suggest
that the high rates of new firm formation in these regions make this an expected result,
but clearly these regions also have greater demand and other characteristics that drive
the high entry rates. An alternative explanation is to say that competition is more
intense in these regions but this is, in many ways, a tautology. Explaining why com-
petitive intensity varies across regions is a more difficult task. However, it is not only
regions with high rates of firm formation that have high failure rates, the figure also
shows some other high failure rate areas: Weston super Mare (directly west of London
and M4 corridor); some authorities in the South Wales valleys, and also Pembrokeshire;
Herefordshire; Liverpool to Manchester corridor; and South Ayrshire in Scotland.
Table 1 shows that there were 2,726 IP-active firms in the 2001 cohort across the
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2001-2005 period. The unique aspect of the database used here is that it contains full
(population) data of IP active firms. Since financial data on R&D are almost never
available for start-up firms, using IP data is one of the few proxies for innovation with
population coverage. An alternative possible proxy is the sub-set of firms located in
high-tech industries (there are 484 such firms).14 The columns in the right hand side of
the table show the failure rates for IP-inactive and IP-active firms, with each of these
split into high-tech and non-high-tech. The failure rate for IP-active firms is lower
than for IP-inactive firms for all regions (except the Highlands, where there were only
4 IP-active firms). Within the group of IP-inactive firms, high-tech firms tend to have
lower failure rates, although this is not always the case, especially for Yorkshire and
the North East RDAs.
The differences highlighted here are interesting as background to innovation policy
but we are, ultimately, interested in why differences occur. One major aspect may
be that failure rates differ across industries and that regions differ according to their
mix of industries. This is something we analyse in more detail in the remainder of the
paper.
5.2 Firm-level and industry-level summary statistics
Table 2 summarizes the basic characteristics of all firms at the beginning of the period
and of those that survived by 2005. Due to the enormous variance in the data with
regard to financial information on firms, we focus on median values. The first column
summarizes the data for the full 2001 cohort, while the second column displays the
2001 values for those firms that survived by 2005. Column three presents the values
for the survivors in 2005. Comparing the values for firms’ financial variables between
columns 1 and 3 shows a fourfold increase in median assets and a twofold increase in
median turnover. Comparing surviving firms and the complete cohort in 2001 shows
that survivors had already in 2001 higher median assets and turnover. In summary,
the statistics suggest both strong growth of surviving firms and the exit of smaller
firms. The data also include the number of directors of a firm, which is used as a proxy
for the managerial skill pool available to a firm. Overall, we observe that the median
number of directors falls from 4 to 3 between 2001 and 2005 for surviving firms and the
complete cohort which suggests that firms start off with more directors than needed to
run their business efficiently.
For the binary variables, we look at mean values to obtain the percentage share
within the sample. As such, the number of subsidiaries increased by 2.42 percentage
14We follow the standard OECD definition: high tech firms as those in UK SIC 244, 353, 33, 32, and
30.
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points between 2001 and 2005 comparing the whole sample in 2001 with the firms still
existing in 2005, which indicates a positive relationship between survival and being part
of a holding company. This is corroborated by looking at the 2001 data for surviving
firms which shows that the share of subsidiaries is significantly higher (8.5 percent)
than for the entire sample (6.6 percent). Foreign ownership increased only slightly,
which has to be interpreted as weak evidence for drop out of domestically owned firms.
The university variable indicates whether a firm is located at British university science
park.15 This variable captures possible effects arising from cooperation agreements
with research institutes, as for example knowledge spillovers, but also the availability of
skilled human resources. Overall, the number of firms linked to universities is very small
for newly incorporated firms. The subsidiary, foreign ownership and university data
are derived from the last set of accounts (e.g. 2005 for survivors), hence these figures
do not capture any changes in a firm’s status through time. Finally, the percentage
share of firms that patent or take out a trade mark is tiny for the entire population of
firms, although there are substantial differences across sectors. It is evident from Table
2, that IP activity increases substantially over time. This holds true both for the entire
sample and the 2001 data for the surviving firms.
Table 2: Firm characteristics of the 2001 cohort (2001 vs. 2005)
Year 2001 Year 2001 Year 2005
All Survivors
Variable Median
Total assets (1,000 £) 7 13 28
Turnover (1,000 £) 55 65 111
No. of directors 4 4 3
Variable Mean
Patent 0.05% 0.06% 0.17%
Trade Mark 0.19% 0.23% 0.52%
Patent / Trade Mark 0.23% 0.28% 0.67%
Subsidiary 6.63% 8.49% 9.05%
Foreign owned 2.39% 2.73% 2.80%
University 0.08% 0.09% 0.10%
To gain further insight about the IP active firms, Table 3 presents a summary of
their characteristics and IP activity. The number of IP active firms more than doubles
within the five-year period. Yet, the share of IP active firms within the 2001 cohort
remains tiny at around 0.7 percent in 2005. UK trade marks are the most common
15This is derived from searching all of the firm’s current address for the word university, hence any
university business park is likely to be picked up by this method.
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form of IP used by the firms. The relatively high number of firms with EPO patents
is surprising.16 The increase in the number of firms obtaining Community trade marks
outpaced the increase in firms taking out UK trade marks. This might point towards
stronger international business orientation of surviving firms.
Table 3: Number of IP active firms / Number of patents and trade marks 2001-2005
Year No. of firms
IP active UK TM Community TM UK patent EPO patent
2001 372 262 57 50 36
2002 940 744 112 77 58
2003 918 611 186 128 81
2004 759 451 187 108 103
2005 761 436 216 115 114
Total 3,750 2,504 758 478 286
Year Average no. of TM Average no. of Patents
UK TM Community TM UK patent EPO patent
2001 1.47 1.69 1.62 1.78
2002 1.43 1.50 1.75 1.47
2003 1.47 1.35 1.37 1.49
2004 1.54 1.35 1.65 1.38
2005 1.53 1.52 1.74 1.58
Total 1.48 1.44 1.61 1.50
6 Survival Analysis
The previous sections have shown that about 30 percent of all newly incorporated firms
failed over the four year period 2001-2005. In this section, we analyze firm failure rates
using survival analysis.
Survival analysis describes the time that elapses from a certain starting point, for
example birth, until a specific event occurs, for example death. Hence, the depen-
dent variable in survival regression analysis is time. Since time is obviously positive
or zero, the data is usually not normally distributed. This could easily be dealt with
using standard econometric techniques. However, besides the conceptual problem of
assuming that time is normally distributed, in survival analysis the data is also right-
censored. This means that individuals are observed only during a certain interval and
the event of interest does not occur for all individuals in the sample within that pe-
16Obtaining an EPO is much more expensive than a UK patent and possibly offers protection through-
out the EU, hence smaller firms might be thought to use EPO patents infrequently.
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riod. Standard statistical techniques are unable to deal with this kind of censoring. In
contrast, survival techniques deal well with this problem and address also the problem
of non-negativity.
To see more clearly the link between firm behavior and our empirical approach,
assume that the number of firms n in the economy evolves over time according to a
M = (Mm)m≥0 discrete-time Markov chain with M0 = 0 and transition matrix P .
Firms can influence a vector of firm characteristics denoted as xt ∈ X. Hence, the
maximization problem is to find the optimal policy for {xt+1}∞t=0 given initial values of
(n0, x0) maximizing
V (n, x) = E{
∞∑
t=0
δtpi(nt, xt)} (1)
where 0 < δ < 1 is a discount factor, subject to
nt+1 = g(nt, xt, t+1) (2)
With t being a sequence of i.i.d. variables. The Bellman equation is therefore for
each i ∈ [1, ...M ]
v(ni, x) = max
x∈X
{pi(n, x) + δ
m∑
j=1
Pijv(nj , x′)} (3)
Where Pij = Pr[nt+1 = nj | nt = ni] for i = 1, ...,M and j = 1, ...,M , which
indicates the probability that transition from state i to j occurs and Pij ≥ 0 and∑m
j=1 Pij = 1.
Now, given the transition matrix P , firms spend a length of time T before transition
from i to j occurs. In our case, we assume that M = 2 such that a state may be either
= 0 if the firm is alive or = 1 if the firm is dead, where death is an absorbing state.
This implies that
M =
0 if 0 ≤ t < T1 if t ≥ T
In survival analysis, we estimate the probability of a firm making a transition from
state i to state j. Alternatively, we can specify the hazard rate of a firm to exit the
market, denoted by h(t), as
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h(t) = Pr(T = t|T ≥ t) = f(t)
S(t)
(4)
where S(t) is the survival function with S(t) = 1− F (t) = Pr(T > t). The hazard
rate is interpreted as the conditional probability density that failure occurs at time t
conditional on the firm having survived up to that point in time. Precisely these hazard
rates constitute the non-zero elements of the transition matrix Pij from the Bellman
equation (3). Hence, in estimating the hazard rate of failure, we estimate firms’ prob-
abilities of transition from state i to j as specified in the optimal control problem in (3).
We first estimate simple hazard and survival functions using nonparametric tech-
niques, only distinguishing between firms that are IP active and those that are IP
inactive. In a second step, we move on to include covariates, using a semi-parametric
model, namely the Cox proportional hazard model and use more refined IP indicators.
It appears to be more appropriate to estimate a proportional hazard model than a
accelerated lifetime model (AFT). In a proportional hazard model covariates shift the
hazard function, while in the AFT model, the hazard function is identical across firms,
but firms move faster along it according to their covariates. For our purpose, shifts in
the hazard function lend themselves more easily for interpretation.17
6.1 Non-parametric Approach
We start by estimating the survival function S(t) using the Kaplan-Meier (1958) esti-
mator. The Kaplan-Meier estimator is a simple frequency non-parametric estimator,
i.e., it does not make any assumptions about the distribution of failure times or how
covariates shift the hazard function. We will use it to estimate separate survival func-
tions for IP active and IP inactive firms and for all British regions and test whether
they are statistically different.
The Kaplan-Meier estimator is given by
Sˆ(t) =
∏
ti≤t
(
1− di
ni
)
(5)
where ni denotes the number of firms in the risk set at ti and di the number of
failures at ti. The product is over all observed failure times less than or equal to t.
17There are very few examples in the literature employing AFT models. For example Cefis and
Marsili (2005) use the AFT model but only because their main variable of interest, the innovation
variable, violates the proportional hazards assumption.
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Since the Kaplan-Meier estimator estimates the hazard or survival function for
each period of risk, we first group firms into year intervals for ease of interpretation.
However, since we are grouping continuous data into discrete intervals, we use the so
called Lifetable estimator to adjust for grouping. The Lifetable estimator produces an
estimate centered on the midpoint of the interval in order to account of firms leaving at
different times within the year-interval (Jenkins, 2005). As one major objective of this
paper is to estimate the effect of firm’s innovative activity on its survival probability, we
group the data set into IP active and IP inactive firms and estimate the corresponding
survival functions for each group. Since IP activity is a proxy for innovation this can
be viewed as a test of survival of innovative firms versus non-innovative firms. We
summarize firms’ overall IP activity with a single dummy variable taking the value of
one if a firm has obtained any form of IP over the period 2001 to 2005.
Figure 2: Survival rates for IP-active and IP-inactive firms
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Table 4 shows the results for the Lifetable estimates for both groups. To test more
formally, whether there is a difference across the two groups, we use the log rank test.
The null hypothesis of the log rank test is that there is no difference between groups.18
18One common criticism of the use of the log rank test is that it gives too much weight to later event
times as the number of observations in the risk sets become relatively small. This is not the case in
our sample as 70 percent of the population survive the five-year interval studied which gives more than
114,000 observations in 2005. We also expect the test to be appropriate as it is best suited as a test
for differences between groups when the hazards of the groups are proportional to each other, which
can be seen in Figure 2 to approximately hold.
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It clearly rejects the null hypothesis at the 1 percent level for the survival function of
IP active and IP inactive firms to be equal.19 In addition, Figure 2 plots the survival
functions for IP-active and IP-inactive groups. The estimated survival function for IP-
active firms lies above the survival function for IP-inactive firms throughout the entire
time analyzed. For both groups of firms, however, the figure shows that risk of failure
increases rapidly during the first two years of existence, which matches our observation
from Section 5 that most firms drop out between their second and third year of life.
Subsequently, the survival rate risk slightly flattens to become steeper again during the
fourth year after incorporation. Table 4 and Figure 2 provide strong indicative evidence
that IP may have an important impact on firms’ chances to survive.
Table 4: Lifetable estimates for IP active and IP inactive firms
Year Total no. No. of S(t) Std.
of firms failures error
IP inactive
2001 159,743 975 0.9939 0.0002
2002 158,768 21,208 0.8611 0.0009
2003 137,560 15,972 0.7611 0.0011
2004 121,587 9,895 0.6992 0.0011
2005 111,688 9,644 0.5881 0.0014
IP active
2001 2,726 1 0.996 0.0004
2002 2,725 70 0.9740 0.0031
2003 2,655 121 0.9296 0.0049
2004 2,534 100 0.8929 0.0059
2005 2,432 109 0.8163 0.0089
Log-rank test for equality of survivor functions
χ2(1) = 499.02 Pr > χ2 = 0.0000
Figure 3 plots the survival rates by region. It shows that there exist differences
across regions. Most noticeably, London and the Highlands stand out. London exhibits
are markedly lower survival rate than any other RDA region. Its survival rate for 2005
is 0.5355, while the one for the Highlands is 0.7164. The survival rates for the other
regions vary between 0.5895 for the North West and 0.6479 for the North East. We also
perform a log rank test for differences in survival rates across RDAs. Also in this case,
the rejects the null hypothesis at the 1 percent level for the survival function across
regions to be equal.
Using year intervals implies that the only thing that is known about entry and exit
19Note that the log rank test yields the same result using continuous rather than grouped data.
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Figure 3: Survival rates across RDA regions
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is that it occurred at some point within the year interval. This problem is known as
interval censoring. To avoid this problem in the subsequent analysis, we construct a
continuous time measure by using complete entry and exit dates for all the analysis
that follows.
6.2 Proportional hazard Cox model
6.2.1 The model
The descriptive evidence of Section 5, and the non-parametric estimates of Section 6.1,
point to substantial differences in firm survival across regions and between IP-active
and inactive firms. An important question is what drives these differences?
In order to take account of such covariates influencing a firm’s hazard function, we
write the hazard function for firm i in a general way as
hi(t) = g(t, β0 + βxxi) (6)
where xi is a vector of covariates and β are the coefficients to be estimated.
The most popular way to estimate the hazard function is to parameterize it as
follows
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hi(t) = h0(t) exp(β0 + βxxi) (7)
which is called the proportional hazard model. It consists of two components,
h0 is the baseline hazard which depends only on t and not on xi and the covariates
exp(β0 + βxxi). The hazard of firm i with covariates xi is, therefore, multiplicatively
proportional to the baseline hazard h0. Hence, the covariates xi shift the hazard by a
constant proportion relative to the baseline hazard. This also implies that the ratio of
firm i’s hazard is proportional to any firm j’s hazard in the sample
h(t|xi)
h(t|xj) =
exp(βxxi)
exp(βxxj)
= exp[βx(xi − xj)] (8)
where exp[βx(xi − xj)] is constant if the covariates do not vary over time.
The functional form of the Cox model (Cox, 1972) is written in the proportional haz-
ard formulation shown above. However, in the Cox model, no specific functional form
for the baseline hazard h0 is assumed. More specifically, due to the way the hazard is
computed, h0 drops out of the calculations. Therefore, the intercept is non-identifiable
and the relationship between the hazard rate and the covariates is estimated without
taking account of h0. This implies that only the relative hazard between firms, not the
absolute hazard rate, can be estimated. The relative hazard at time t between firms i
and j is defined by (8). The coefficients β are estimated using the Partial Likelihood
(PL) method instead of the Maximum Likelihood (ML) method. The PL considers
only the ordered failure times while the ML estimator focuses on firm spells. Hence,
the Cox model is notably ignoring all information available at times when no failure
occurs. This is done because the Cox model assumes that spells in which no failure
occurs contain little information on the incidence of failure. Cox (1972) has shown that
ignoring those spells results only in little efficiency loss.
It is important to test for whether the proportional hazard assumption holds for
our data. A range of tests were conducted, including graphical tests plotting the log
Kaplan-Meier estimator, log(− log Sˆ(t)), against log t and tests based on the residuals.
We find the models estimated below to be appropriate. Finally, as with all such analysis,
it is important to stress that the coefficients obtained from estimating (7) should be
interpreted as correlations, and cannot be given a causal interpretation.
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6.2.2 Results for IP variables
The first column of results in Table 5 are from a parsimonious specification, which
simply includes separate dummy variables for a firm having a patent - UK and/or
EPO - or a trade mark - UK and/or Community. The results are consistent with the
non-parametric estimations.20 Having a patent is associated with a reduction of the
hazard rate by 55 percent, and having a trade mark, with a reduction of the hazard by
slightly more than 52 percent.21 These are substantial effects. The second column of
Table 5 presents the results for patent and trade mark counts. These results allow us
to distinguish between the effect of the different forms of IP on the hazard of failure.
UK and EPO patents show very similar associations with survival, lowering the hazard
rate by about 40 percent for each patent. However, there is a marked difference in the
effect of UK and Community trade marks. While each UK trade mark is associated
with a drop in the hazard rate by about 40 percent, Community trade marks have an
effect of only little more than 24 percent. Note, however, that most IP-active firms in
the sample only have one patent or one trade mark (see Table 3).
6.2.3 Regional effects
The third specification in Table 5 adds the RDA dummy variables. The Highlands
is the benchmark category since we know from Section 6.1 that it is the RDA region
with the highest survival rate. Hence, all other regions are measured according to how
much more likely firms are to fail than in the Highlands. The results show substantial
differences among the RDA coefficients. The coefficient for London is the largest in
magnitude, pointing to a 87 percent increased failure rate relative to the Highlands.
Another region with a substantially higher failure rate is the North West (55 percent
vis-a`-vis firms in the Highlands). The magnitude and statistical significance of the
patent and trade mark coefficients remain almost unaffected from the inclusion of RDA
dummies.
In the last three columns of Table 5 a variety of firm and industry level variables are
also added to the specification (see Section 6.2.4), but two further regional variables are
also added which we discuss here: unemployment and house prices. The statistically
significant coefficient on the unemployment rate indicates that higher unemployment
shifts the hazard rate upwards. This is consistent with high unemployment being as-
20All estimates in Table 5 have adjusted standard errors to account for within group correlation.
Note that the number of firms falls by 28,671 once we include sector-level variables as the corresponding
information is missing in FAME for these firms.
21Coefficients have to be exponentiated to obtain this interpretation of their magnitude, e.g., 1 −
exp(−0.797) = 0.55.
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sociated with low demand or that high unemployment regions have other structural
impediments (such as lack of access to finance, poor infrastructure, etc.). The other
region variable is house prices. Since some argue that high house prices may allow
entrepreneurs to raise more finance (since their house can act as collateral), high house
prices could be associated with higher survival (as struggling firms can borrow more).
However, high house prices are also associated with high wage and rental costs, which
could reduce survival. Moreover, high house prices may generate greater entry of firms,
which could increase subsequent exit rates. After some investigation regarding the
functional form of our specification, the use of a quadratic term for house prices seems
appropriate. Higher house prices initially shift the hazard rate down, but after a thresh-
old value (£170,000) house prices are associated with an increase in hazard. This is
consistent with the idea that house prices are valuable as collateral but at some point
the high wage and rental costs offset this advantage.
6.2.4 Industry and firm level effects
The remaining three columns of Table 5 also condition on firm-level and industry-level
variables. All industry-level variables have been calculated on the SIC 3-digit level using
the entire OFLIP database (i.e., all firms in the economy). Therefore, they reflect the
environment in which the new firms operate. The last column of in Table 5 adds a set
of 2-digit industry dummies as a further robustness check.
At the industry level, we include a proxy for market entry and exit costs as pro-
posed by Bernard and Jensen (2007).22 Capital intensity, computed as the ratio of
the amount of firms’ assets and labor within each industry, is also added. To measure
how important firm size is within each industry, we computed the minimum efficiency
scale (MES) as the ratio of average first-year firm size to average firm size within the
industry (as proposed by Baldwin and Gellatly, 2003). This provides a better measure
of firm size in the industry than the traditional MES measure as used by, for example,
Fritsch et al. (2005). To proxy for competition within industries the standard four-firm
concentration ratio is included. Alternative proxies for competition were explored, such
as the Herfindahl index (Mata and Portugal, 1994) or the price-cost-margin (Aghion et
al. 2005); all measures yield very similar results. Finally, the industry growth rate mea-
sured by growth in industry-level assets, is also added. Asset growth is used since data
coverage is substantially higher than for turnover or employment (for growth variables
see Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995).
The firm-level variables have been defined already (see Table 2) and include a uni-
22The proxy is constructed as follows Entry/Exit costs = 1−min[entryrate; exitrate].
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versity, foreign owned and subsidiary dummies, along with (log of) number of directors
plus IP variables.
The coefficients and significance for the industry and firm level variables are very
similar across all three specifications (an exception is the coefficient on the four firm
concentration ratio which loses significance in the last column of Table 5). The coeffi-
cient of the proxy for entry and exit costs is negative, statistically highly significant and
very large in magnitude in both specifications (using IP dummies or counts). Bernard
and Jensen (2007) also found higher entry/exit costs to lower the failure rate of firms.
This is consistent with the idea that high entry/exit costs restrict competition. The
positive coefficients on capital intensity implies that increasing capital intensity shifts
the failure hazard up. This is consistent with new firms being credit-constrained and
therefore find it more difficult to survive in more capital intensive industries. The coeffi-
cient on the MES variable is never statistically significant. The four-firm concentration
ratio provides an interesting result. According to the negative and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient, industries with higher concentration warrant a lower hazard of failure.
We interpret this result as the outcome of less competition and possibly higher prices
(through for example collusion) in more concentrated industries. The significance of
this coefficient is lost when industry dummies are added. Contrary to Audretsch (1991),
industry growth has a statistically significant effect on the hazard rate in all three spec-
ifications.
At the firm-level, firms linked to universities have a lower hazard rate than other
firms. The effect is sizeable, with a downward shift of the hazard function by around
59 percent. This result is consistent with spillovers from, and collaboration with, uni-
versities, raising survival, and also that small, university-based start-ups may receive
assistance during their early years of existence (e.g. subsidized rent). Similar to Au-
dretsch and Mahmood (1995) and Bernard and Jensen (2007), we find that subsidiaries
are less likely to exit the market (perhaps due to financial constraints being less bind-
ing). Similarly, firms owned by foreign firms are less likely to exit. Finally, increasing
the log of the number of directors lowers the hazard of failure by about 28 percent. More
directors could indicate more skill or management resources for the firm, or possibly
that the quality of the business idea is higher.
Despite adding the above variables, the coefficients on the patent and trade mark
dummies remain statistically significant, although coefficient magnitude falls. How-
ever, including the industry and firm level variables does reduce significance on IP
count variables: only the coefficients of UK patents and trade marks remain statis-
tically significant. Both EPO patents and Community trade marks no longer have a
statistically significant effect on the hazard of failure (see last two columns of Table
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5). Note also that the coefficients on the RDA dummies remain statistically significant
(apart from the coefficient for the North East).
6.3 Differences in the survival rates of IP-active firms across regions
The differences in survival rates across regions are almost always statistically signifi-
cant even when conditioning on industry and firm level variables in Table 5. Ideally,
one would like to know why these differences occur. It is likely that our explanatory
variables fail to control completely for important aspects of firm characteristics, such
as quality of workers or access to finance. There is also the possibility that the various
industry variables fail to capture important aspects of the competitive process in differ-
ent industries. Generating further variables is an objective of further work in this area
and, ultimately, it may be possible to remove the significance of the RDA dummies
by achieving statistical independence of survival and regional dummies conditional on
these additional variables.
Even with the data at hand we can provide some additional insight into the role
of RDAs, and regional factors more generally, by looking at whether IP-active firms
experience different survival rates according to their location. In order to do this, the
set of RDA dummies is interacted with an IP dummy, and these interaction terms
are added to the specification in the last regression in Table 5.23 Table 6 shows the
results for the IP dummy, RDA indicators and their interaction terms. The estimated
coefficients of all other covariates have been omitted (as their qualitative implications
have not changed relative to the results presented in Table 5).
The first and third columns results in Table 6 do not include the new interaction
terms and how the coefficient of the IP dummy is negative and statistically significant.
This implies a downward shift of the hazard of failure of approximately 64 percent,
confirming the basic findings from Table 5.
Including the interaction terms in column 2, the coefficient of the IP dummy variable
turns positive, but is not statistically different from zero. Hence, the effect of IP on
a firm’s hazard of failure is given solely by the coefficient of the interaction term for
the respective RDA in which a firm operates. The coefficients show that IP-activity is
negatively correlated with firm failure for all regions, although the coefficients are not
statistically significant for the East Midlands and Scotland. These results hold when a
set of 2-digit industry dummies is added (column 4).
The results show that IP-active firms in London have lower hazards of failure than
23The IP dummy assumes the value of 1 if a firm has either a patent or a trade mark or both. We
chose to use an IP dummy instead of separate patent and trade mark dummies due to multicollinearity,
which occurs when we included interaction terms of both patent and trade mark dummies with regional
dummies.
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all other regions, except for the North East and Wales. Overall, these results show that
IP-activity has differential effects on the survival of firms across regions. This provides
an answer to the question posed in the introduction: does a firm that is IP active in
North East England have the same chance of survival as an IP active firm in South East
England? Table 6 implies that IP-active firms in the North East have lower hazard
rates than firms in the South East.
To summarize these results, Table 7 shows a ranking of regions based on their
survival rates (relative to Highlands), with the first column based on survival rates of
IP-active firms within that region. The North East is ranked number one since it has
the lowest coefficient in Table 6, namely -3.419. The second ranked region based on IP-
active firms is Wales (with a coefficient of -2.424) and so on. The second column shows
ranking based on conditional survival probabilities (from the coefficients on region
dummies in column six in Table 5). The third column shows the unconditional survival
rates for IP-inactive firms (from Table 1).
For IP-active firms, column one of Table 7 shows that the North East and Wales have
the highest ranking, suggesting that conditions in these regions are conducive to new,
innovative firms (although it is possible that new, IP active firms in these regions have
better ideas, management or other unobserved characteristic that drives the results).
The North East and Wales also have relatively good survival rates using conditional
or unconditional ranks for non IP-active new firms (second and third columns). It is
interesting to consider the London region. IP-active firms fair relatively well in London,
whereas the second and third column show that overall survival rates are poor. This
result is consistent with IP-active firms based in London benefiting from the presence
of knowledge spillovers, as well as close proximity to specialist skills and finance. At the
bottom of the table are Scotland and the East Midlands (although we should note that
the difference in coefficients in Table 6 for these regions and others with low ranking is
not large).
7 Conclusion
This paper uses a new database to analyze the survival of the complete cohort of all
British companies registered in 2001. The database is able to track the outcome of
these 162,000 firms to 2005 and also, uniquely, their intellectual property (IP) activity
during 2001-2005. The paper focuses on two important policy-related issues. The
first is the extent to which IP activity alters the survival outcomes of these start-up
firms. The second is whether, and to what extent, survival of start-up firms varies
across regions. Intellectual property activity is captured by four measures: UK patent
publications, EPO patent publications, UK trade mark publications and Community
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trade mark registrations. Over the five year period, 3,750 (2.3 percent) of the 2001
start-up firms use one or more of these forms of IP. The most common form of IP
used is a UK trade mark, followed by Community trade marks and then UK patents.
The dominance of trade marks reflects two factors. First, obtaining a trade mark is
cheaper and easier than patent protection. Second, trade marks are used by all sectors
in the economy, hence they also capture IP activity by service sector firms. The use
of trade marks in empirical research is novel, hence we should clarify what trade mark
activity indicates. Our expectation is that a trade mark proxies the launch of a new,
or upgraded, product; hence, we expect a trade mark to indicate innovation. The use
of patent data in empirical research is more common, although there are few studies
on small, start-up firms.
RDAs were set up to coordinate substantial assistance to firms with the core aim of
encouraging enterprise, employment and competitiveness (in 2005/6 the budget for the
English RDA’s was £2.2 billion). Given the existence of these RDAs, it is interesting
to ask if and how firm survival varies across them. The answer is that there are large
differences. The failure rate of the 2001 cohort of firms by 2005 varies between 36
percent in London to 22 percent in the Highlands (Table 1). Looking at firms in high-
tech sectors we also find wide variations in failure rates across RDAs. Table 1 also
indicates that the failure rates of IP-active firms varies across RDAs, although in this
case the highest rate is 15 percent in the North West (London is now 11 percent). This
also indicates that the failure rate for IP active firms are substantially lower than for
IP-inactive firms. This is a result that runs through all of our analysis. The differential
ranking of regions summarized in Table 7 represents important background for policy
makers since it implies the high survival rates of regions like the North East and Wales
might have lessons for other regions.
Why might failure rates vary so much across regions? A short answer is that com-
petitive conditions vary. This, in turn, is due to differing industrial structures and
economic conditions within each region. Section 5 uses a Cox proportional hazards
model to investigate these issues and, at the same time, it includes firm-level IP and
other characteristics that might influence survival. The results indicate that higher
unemployment reduces rates of survival for new firms. For house prices, the analysis
suggests a quadratic relationship, with higher house prices initially showing a positive
association with survival, but this relationship stops around £170,000. The results in-
dicate, as expected, that competitive conditions are important. Variables for exit/entry
costs, capital intensity and concentration (all defined at 3-digit SIC level) are all sig-
nificant. IP activity is now disaggregated into its four components and we find that
only UK patents and trade marks are significantly positively correlated with survival,
with the coefficient for UK trade marks being similar in magnitude to UK patents.
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The results also show that being located near a university reduces failure rates, as does
being foreign owned or part of a larger group of firms. We also find that firms with
more directors have higher survival rates.
The Cox model also includes a set of dummies for the RDAs. If the industry-
level and firm-level variables, unemployment rates and house prices across counties
and unitary authorities had completely explained the regional differences we would
have expected the coefficients on these RDA dummies to be insignificant. This is not
the case: there are still significant differences in survival rates across RDAs despite
controlling for a range of factors. These differences are due to unobserved factors, some
of these could relate to very specific industry factors, but others are likely to relate to
the availability of resources or support to start-up firms.
Finally, the paper finds that the survival rates of IP-active firms varies across re-
gions. IP-active firms in the North East, Wales and London have the highest survival
rates. These results indicate that the link between survival for a region’s IP-active,
and its non IP-active firms, is not strong. For example, London ranks third best for
survival for IP-active firms, but eleventh in terms of unconditional survival of all firms.
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A Data Appendix
In this appendix, we outline details regarding the construction of the data set and de-
scribes some issues related to the measurement of the IP variables used in our analysis
above.
At the county and unitary authority level, we added house prices measured as the
average price of all property types within a county or unitary authority. The data
for England and Wales comes from the Land Registry’s Residential Property Price
Reports.24 The data for Scotland comes from the Halifax House Price Index.25 The
data for Scotland is available only at a slightly more aggregate level applying the
definitions of the former local government regions of Scotland. Whenever the data is
available, we use prices of the final quarter of the preceding year as our measure of
house prices.
Unemployed rates are measured as the ratio of unemployed over all economically
active persons, by county and unitary authority. The data comes from the UK Office
for National Statistics’ Labour Force Survey (LFS) where we calculated annual aver-
ages from the quarterly data available.26
The IP data also includes application date, although it is only available for IP that
has been published. Equally, for those patents which succeeded in being granted also
the grant year is available. IP is commonly regarded as an output measure of innovation
and we use it as a proxy for the quality of business ideas. Hence, if the objective is
to measure whether it conveys a firm any competitive edge over its competitors, it
seems appropriate to use publication date (registration date in case of Community
trade marks) as the reference point.
Patent data have been widely used in applied work for very diverse purposes. Yet,
the use of patent data has many more or less well-documented pitfalls. A problem
with using UK and EPO patents arises from the fact that sometimes applicants file the
same or very similar applications at both institutions. For example, firms may apply
first for a patent at the UK office and then use the obtained priority date to file for an
EPO patent making the same, or very similar, claims. Such patents belong to the same
patent family and it is unclear whether they should all be counted as single patents.27
On the one hand, since these patents are based on the same invention, they do not
24http://www.landreg.gov.uk/.
25http://www.hbosplc.com/economy/housingresearch.asp.
26http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Source.asp?vlnk=358
27If the exactly same application is made to both institutions, one of the two has to be withdrawn
once one of the institutions grants the patent.
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each represent a new innovation by the firm. On the other, as we are interested in
whether firms gain any competitive advantage from patenting, such strategic patenting
may matter. We therefore count patents pertaining to the same patent family as single
patents.
Another concern when using patent data is heterogeneity across patents with respect
to their actual value. In particular, it is argued that many patents are of little or no
value. The patent literature has developed a number of possible ways to discriminate
among patents, including the fact whether a patent was actually granted, the number of
citations received, the respective patent family size, renewals, opposition and litigation
and direct values reported by the firms themselves in surveys (van Zeebroeck, 2007).
In our situation there are various problems with such methods. Using patent grants
for new firms would mean the firms may already be two to four years old by the
time the patent is granted. In a similar way, the use of citations (or renewals) means
waiting for several years after the patent is granted, meaning we could study at the
earliest startups in the 1990s. Our data has no information on opposition, litigation
and patent family size and, in any event, these may be more important for larger firms.
Given this, we adopt a rather crude measure by distinguishing between UK and EPO
patents, where EPO patents are considered more valuable. The importance is not
only reflected in distinctively higher fees for EPO patents, but due to the international
scope of EPO patents. An EPO patent application costs Euro 4000, while a UK patent
application costs around Euro 300. In fact, applications for EPO are likely to be much
higher since it needs to be submitted in two languages and use of a patent attorney is
strongly recommended. For both EPO and UK patents, the application is published,
if the application passes an initial examination, after 18 months. Hence, our use of
publications means that there is an 18 month delay from submitting original invention.
It can be expected that only more valuable patents will be patented in several countries
other than the country in which the firm is registered.
In the UK, trade marks can be obtained either through an application to the UK
Intellectual Property Office for a UK Trade Mark, or through an application to the
Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market for a Community Trade Mark. Fees
differ substantially, as the UK trade mark costs about 300 Euros while the Community
trade mark costs around 2000 Euros. For trade marks, the difference between using
publication data and registration date is small (around 90 percent of published trade
marks are registered within a few months).
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Table 5: Cox Regression
Variables Coefficient
Sector level
Entry/Exit costs .. .. .. -14.446*** -14.442*** -13.010***
(0.238) (0.238) (0.511)
Capital intensity .. .. .. 0.006* 0.006* 0.042***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
MES .. .. .. 3.005 3.019 -1.048
(6.061) (6.061) (6.509)
4-Firm Concentration Ratio .. .. .. -0.074** -0.075** 0.032
(0.032) (0.032) (0.044)
Industry Growth Rate .. .. .. 0.098** 0.098** 0.097*
(0.043) (0.043) (0.057)
Firm level
Patent Dummy -0.797*** .. .. -0.438** .. ..
(0.182) (0.211)
UK Patent Count .. -0.534*** -0.517*** .. -0.507** -0.539**
(0.184) (0.182) (0.229) (0.233)
EPO Patent Count .. -0.546** -0.538** .. -0.066 -0.095
(0.221) (0.221) (0.217) (0.223)
Trade Mark Dummy -0.742*** .. .. -0.657*** .. ..
(0.083) (0.101)
UK TM Count .. -0.516*** -0.523*** .. -0.525*** -0.538***
(0.087) (0.088) (0.096) (0.097)
CTM Count .. -0.275** -0.301** .. -0.208 -0.224
(0.119) (0.122) (0.152) (0.153)
University .. .. .. -0.891*** -0.896*** -0.894***
(0.294) (0.294) (0.295)
Ln no. of Directors .. .. .. -0.334*** -0.335*** -0.294***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Foreign Owned .. .. .. -0.816*** -0.816*** -0.827***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049)
Subsidiary .. .. .. -2.049*** -2.048*** -2.038***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
County / Unitary Authority
Unemployment rate .. .. .. 4.737*** 4.735*** 4.829***
(0.469) (0.469) (0..470)
Ln Housing prices .. .. .. -4.011*** -4.011** -3.755**
(1.439) (1.439) (1.458)
Ln (Housing prices)2 .. .. .. 0.165*** 0.165** 0.156**
(0.060) (0.060) (0.061)
RDAs
South West .. .. 0.252*** 0.282** 0.282** 0.312**
.. .. (0.095) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123)
South East .. .. 0.374*** 0.309** 0.309** 0.339***
.. .. (0.094) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124)
London .. .. 0.626*** 0.532*** 0.532*** 0.557***
.. .. (0.094) (0.128) (0.128) (0.129)
East of England .. .. 0.379*** 0.409*** 0.409*** 0.433***
.. .. (0.095) (0.122) (0.122) (0.123)
East Midlands .. .. 0.274*** 0.253** 0.253** 0.276**
.. .. (0.096) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123)
Yorkshire .. .. 0.326*** 0.322*** 0.322*** 0.347***
.. .. (0.095) (0.122) (0.122) (0.123)
North West .. .. 0.437*** 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.369***
.. .. (0.095) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122)
West Midlands .. .. 0.389*** 0.424*** 0.424*** 0.455***
.. .. (0.095) (0.121) (0.121) (0.122)
North East .. .. 0.240** 0.118 0.118 0.146
.. .. (0.099) (0.127) (0.127) (0.128)
Wales .. .. 0.295*** 0.239* 0.239** 0.255**
.. .. (0.097) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125)
Scotland .. .. 0.258*** 0.272** 0.272** 0.293**
.. .. (0.096) (0.122) (0.122) (0.123)
Highland .. .. dropped dropped dropped dropped
Industry dummies .. .. .. .. .. included
Number of firms: 162,374 162,374 162,374 133,703 133,703 133,703
Number of observations: 701,101 701,101 701,101 591,182 591,182 591,182
Number of failures: 58,043 58,043 58,043 35,756 35,756 35,756
Notes:
1. Adjusted standard errors for within correlation in parentheses.
2. * indicates significance at 10%; * at 5%; ** at 1%.
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Table 6: Cox Regression: IP-Region Interactions
Variables Coefficient
IP Dummy -1.013*** 0.975 -1.041*** 0.889
(0.062) (0.966) (0.062) (0.960)
South West 0.289** 0.303** 0.319** 0.333***
(0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124)
South East 0.317** 0.329*** 0.347*** 0.359***
(0.123) (0.124) (0.124) (0.125)
London 0.540*** 0.555*** 0.566*** 0.581***
(0.128) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129)
East of England 0.417*** 0.430*** 0.439*** 0.453***
(0.122) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124)
East Midlands 0.262** 0.272** 0.285** 0.294**
(0.122) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124)
Yorkshire 0.331*** 0.344*** 0.357*** 0.369***
(0.122) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124)
North West 0.342*** 0.354*** 0.376*** 0.388***
(0.121) (0.122) (0.122) (0.123)
West Midlands 0.431*** 0.443*** 0.462*** 0.475***
(0.121) (0.122) (0.122) (0.123)
North East 0.126 0.144 0.154 0.173
(0.127) (0.128) (0.128) (0.129)
Wales 0.248** 0.264** 0.264** 0.279**
(0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.126)
Scotland 0.281** 0.291** 0.303** 0.312**
(0.122) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124)
Highland dropped dropped dropped dropped
IP dummy × South West .. -2.081** .. -2.029**
.. (1.001)) .. (0.996)
IP dummy × South East .. -1.813* .. -1.757*
.. (0.978) .. (0.972)
IP dummy × London .. -2.234** .. -2.166**
.. (0.973) .. (0.967)
IP dummy × East of England .. -1.999** .. -1.944**
.. (0.995) .. (0.989)
IP dummy × East Midlands .. -1.632 .. -1.575
.. (0.995) .. (0.989)
IP dummy × Yorkshire .. -1.919* .. -1.863*
.. (0.997) .. (0.991)
IP dummy × North West .. -1.817* .. -1.759*
.. (0.987) .. (0.981)
IP dummy × West Midlands .. -1.925* .. -1.875*
.. (0.985) .. (0.979)
IP dummy × North East .. -3.419** .. -3.365**
.. (1.380) .. (1.375)
IP dummy × Wales .. -2.424** .. -2.386**
.. (1.090) .. (1.083)
IP dummy × Scotland .. -1.603 .. -1.538
.. (0.988) .. (0.983)
IP dummy × Highland dropped dropped dropped dropped
Industry dummies .. .. included included
Number of firms: 133,703 133,703 133,703 133,703
Number of observations: 591,182 591,182 591,182591,182
Number of failures: 35,756 35,756 35,756 35,755
Notes:
1. Adjusted standard errors for within correlation in parentheses.
2. * indicates significance at 10%; * at 5%; ** at 1%.
3. Covariates include: Entry/exit costs, capital intensity, MES, 4-firm concen-
tration ratio, industry growth rate, university indicator, ln no. of directors,
foreign-owned indicator, subsidiary indicator, unemployment rate, ln housing
prices, ln (housing prices)2
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Table 7: Ranking of regions based on survival probabilities of new firms
IP-active firms All firms (conditional) All firms (unconditional)
North East 1 1 2
Wales 2 2 4
London 3 11 10
South West 4 5 1
East of England 5 9 7
West Midlands 6 10 8
Yorkshire 7 7 5
North West 8 8 9
South East 9 6 6
East Midlands 10 3 3
Scotland 11 4 3
Notes:
1. Table shows ranking of regions according to relative firm survival rates with
respect to Highlands. First column shows ranking for IP-active firms (based
on Table 5). Second column shows ranking based on conditional survival
probabilities (from coefficients on region dummies in column six in Table 5).
The third column shows unconditional survival probabilities based on region
for all IP-inactive firms (see Table 1)
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Figure 4: Failure rates of IP-inactive firms by county / unitary authority
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